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[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy.
Justice Douglas, Griswold v. Connecticut
And they strove to weave a Shadow of the Emanation
To hide themselves....
William Blake, "Jerusalem"
I. GNOSTICISM IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
A. Introduction
In Griswold v. Connecticut,' a defining moment in modern
American constitutionalism, a visionary reading of the Bill of Rights
coils for the leap to substantive due process. On the far side of the
leap-our side-both Roe v. Wade' and Bowers v. Hardwick' have
served to measure the legitimacy and the reach of Griswold's vision.
It is a mistake, however, to make the Court's later cases about abor-
tion or homosexuality, however one appraises the adequacy of their
outcomes or justifications, the measure of Griswold's importance.
When Justice Douglas, writing for the Court in Griswold, offered his
generous new interpretation of the texts of liberty, he at once opened
and closed far wider horizons of constitutional thought. To grasp the
larger significance of what Douglas said and did in Griswold, it is
helpful to recognize in his opinion certain themes, aspirations, and
* The author is grateful for the thoughtful research assistance of Vince Herron, and for the
helpful comments of Edward J. McCaffery, Wayne A. Meeks, Stephen R. Munzer, Jim Wood,
and the staff of the Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities. This essay is written in
remembrance of Thomas Emerson.
1. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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hermeneutical moves that have always been associated with Gnos-
ticism.
Throughout this Article, "Gnosticism" and "Gnostic" will refer to
a variety of traditions and speculations that flourished in Hellenistic
culture, and that produced texts which (for all their differences) share
common features justifying their inclusion by contemporary experts
in anthologies of sources.4 Uncapitalized, "gnosticism" and "gnostic"
refer to poetic or constitutional ideas comparable to (but not
necessarily influenced by) those expressed in the ancient traditions
and speculations. In offering an interpretation of Griswold as a
gnostic writing, and in explaining how that interpretation brings out
Griswold's wider significance in American constitutionalism, I make
no claim about Douglas's own familiarity with, or intellectual
indebtedness to, Gnostic religious texts. The distinction between
"Gnostic" and "gnostic" is meant to maintain this analytic separation.
Griswold is gnostic, I will suggest, hermeneutically: that is, in its
interpretive posture toward the Constitution (and more specifically
toward the Bill of Rights as the text of liberty). Douglas's
interpretation of the text of liberty offers the prospect of a more
complete realization of liberty's concealed meaning. Formally,
Griswold's gnosticism consists in its strategy for redemptive or
emancipatory interpretation: retelling the creation story in such a way
as to relativize conventional accounts of the natural order and to
privilege an account of a more vivid and consequential reality by
backdating it, rendering it first in time and first in priority. Substan-
tively, Griswold's gnosticism inheres in its treatment of the themes of
sacred marriage, nonprocreativity, "penumbra," and "emanation."
Ultimately, in viewing Griswold as a gnostic writing, we are made
newly aware that stories of creation and redemption help define the
ambiguities of embodiment and generation by bringing out surprising
meanings in traditional, canonical texts.
Today more than ever we need to be surprised into thought by the
intense meanings of the texts of liberty. An interpretation of Griswold
as a gnostic writing highlights its emancipatory passion and refuses to
mask its strangeness. The interpretation resists the domestication of
Griswold into a contemporary constitutional world of majoritarian
resignation and lowered expectations. But by understanding Griswold
as a gnostic writing we highlight not only its promise but also its
disappointment, and the relation of the two to one another. If the
higher meanings of the texts of liberty are to be championed once
again, we will need not so much to follow Douglas as to redeem him.
4. See BENTLEY LAYTON. THE GNOSTIC SCRIPTURES (1987).
[Vol. 7: 97
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Douglas's effort to reveal and realize the higher meanings of the
texts of liberty has aroused both admiration and scorn. It is a measure
of Griswold's importance that pretenders to orthodoxy have felt the
need to denounce the opinion as dangerous heresy.' Neither its
friends nor its critics, however, have taken the true measure of
Griswold's heterodoxy. To appreciate the more challenging aspects of
the opinion, we must situate Douglas's themes in relation not only to
prevailing directions of constitutional interpretation and argument but
also to certain undercurrents in American constitutional thought. Two
such undercurrents-the constitutional ethic of creation and
redemptive constitutionalism-merit special concern. Griswold's
originality consists in its bid to redefine redemptive constitutionalism
in opposition to the ethic of creation. I will briefly define these
constitutional currents, then explain Griswold's gnostic aspirations in
relation to them.
B. Creation and Redemption
The constitutional ethic of creation conceives of all human persons
as sharing equally the unique dignity and worth that attaches to the
one creature made in the image and likeness of God. Adherents of
this ethic typically associate it, among the texts of American
constitutionalism, with the Declaration of Independence.
Sometimes the ethic is sharply critical, as when Lincoln made it the
basis of his challenge to the partisans of slavery:
These communities, by their representatives in old Independence
Hall, said to the whole world of men: "We hold these truths to
be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that
among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." This
5. See ROBERT BORK. THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 234, 263, 95 (1990) (describing Griswold as an "intellectual catastrophe," a decision whose
reasoning "was not meant to be taken seriously," and as the "construction of a constitutional
time bomb").
Justice Scalia stands foremost, perhaps., among those who denounce gnostic constitutionalism.
In demanding that the Constitution be read according to the public traditions of the common
law rather than according to the private revelations of the judge (however wise or penetrating),
Scalia plays the modern-day Bishop, casting himself as Irenaeus and Douglas as Valentinus:
"The notion that the Constitution, through some penumbra emanating from the Privileges and
Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause, establishes this Court as a Platonic check upon
the society's greedy adherence to its traditions can only be described as imperious." Burnham
v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 627 n.5 (1990).
The Gnostics agreed that there was an overt tradition of Christian belief and worship, but
then also claimed that the apostles of Jesus and their followers had kept alive a covert tradition,
reflecting the true meaning of what Jesus said, and of who he was. Irenaeus insisted that the
only valid tradition was the public one. ELAINE PAGELS, THE GNOSTIC GOSPELS 54 (1981). So
Scalia insists today. For him, the textual penumbra is above all a realm of uncertain private
knowledge or opinion, undisciplined by the objectivity of public institutional tradition.
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was their majestic interpretation of the economy of the Universe.
This was their lofty, and wise, and noble understanding of the
justice of the Creator to His creatures. [Applause.] Yes,
gentlemen, to all His creatures, to the whole great family of man.
In their enlightened belief, nothing stamped with the Divine
image and likeness was sent into the world to be trodden on, and
degraded, and imbruted by his fellows.6
At other times the ethic is more complacent in tone and more
apologetic in function, as when Justice Bradley made the following
well-known remarks in his concurrence in Bradwell v. Illinois7 :
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized
a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man
and woman. . . . The constitution of the family organization,
which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature
of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly
belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. ... The
paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble
and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the
Creator.8
Although Lincoln's and Bradley's remarks seem to run in opposite
political directions, they share moral and constitutional features.
Morally, both Lincoln and Bradley appeal to the created order of
nature as the ground of obligations among persons. Constitutionally,
both understand fundamental law in a way that refers it necessarily to
this moral ground. Thus, the ethic of creation supplies
constitutionalism with a metaphysical basis for decisions about the
content of rights and obligations.
There is no general agreement, however, that constitutionalism
needs or wants such a metaphysical basis. Indeed, one might go so far
as to say that orthodoxy in modem constitutional law is defined by its
adoption of the antimetaphysical position of Justice Holmes's
celebrated dissent in Lochner v. New York.9 Many would find that
"all men are created equal" is neither a legitimate constitutional
premise (since a constitution "is made for people of fundamentally
differing views"' 0) nor a useful one (since "[gleneral propositions do
not decide concrete cases""1).
6. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Speech at Lewistown (Aug. 21,1858), in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 546 (Roy Basler ed., 1953) [hereinafter WORKS OF LINCOLN4].
7. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (rejecting constitutional challenge to state law barring
women from practice of law).
8. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
9. 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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The constitutional ethic of creation has exerted its characteristic
pressure upon orthodox constitutionalism by means of a special kind
of historical revisionism: a redating of the Creation designed at once
to relativize the conventional founding narrative and to privilege a
tale of earlier and more fundamental origins. This historical
revisionism defines the formal element of gnosticism. In Gnostic
religious traditions, the Creator God of Genesis is represented as a
belated demigod who, far from creating humankind, imprisons it in a
derivative materiality. 2 To achieve this representation, Gnostic
mythology draws back the curtains to reveal the drama of earlier and
more decisive beginnings. Lincoln revises history to the same effect
in the Gettysburg Address and especially in his First Inaugural, as we
shall see in Section IV.B.2. The union, together with its constitutional
commitments, predates the Constitution itself. To tell the creation
story of American constitutionalism properly is to hark back to the
principles of 1776, which in turn refer to an even earlier and more
decisive creation story. Thus the constitutionalism animated by the
ethic of creation seeks legitimation by formal gnosticism.
A wide array of theological commitments, however, remain unful-
filled by the ethic of creation and the formal gnosticism that seeks to
establish the ethic's legitimacy and priority. Those who reject the call
of creation define human nature and destiny in terms of the looming
prospect of redemption. The status of having been chosen by God for
salvation, however salvation is understood, displaces the status of
having been made in God's image and likeness as the basis of rights
and responsibilities, thus uprooting the very constitutional ethic that
the status was marshalled to support.
From what and to what we are redeemed, however, remain sharply
controverted. Are we redeemed from the sinfulness that destroyed
Eden, to a second Eden achieved by grace with the cooperation of
faith? Or are we redeemed from the very limitations of nature, from
the finitude that inheres precisely in the status of creatureliness, to a
reintegration with divinity itself?
It is unnecessary here to give a complete account of these alter-
natives or to decide just what is at stake in them. It is enough to
notice that it is common to deny that humankind's status as created
in God's image and likeness states the final word on the human
condition, and instead to give priority to some account of the human
situation that stresses the presence (or expectation) of redemption and
the response that God's redemptive act should elicit. Gnosticism in
religion has offered one way of working out the relationship between
12. GIOVANNI FILORAMO, A HISTORY OF GNOSTICISM 78 (1990).
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redemption and creation. If the formal aspect of gnosticism consists
in revising creation stories in order to privilege new accounts of the
beginnings and their associated commitments, the substantive aspect
of gnosticism is defined by an account of redemption as a final
overthrow of the limits inherent in the creaturely state. Theologically,
Gnosticism stands not only against the ethic of creation, but also
against competing views of redemption that would subordinate
creation to redemption, though not in the specifically Gnostic way.
Only by achieving the higher meaning and knowledge hidden behind
the facade of the cosmogonic narrative (the formal element) can the
human person participate in the acosmic redemptive drama that
finally realizes the being and power of anthropos, humanity. 3
If the ethic of creation has motivated a countercurrent in American
constitutionalism, so has the aspiration to redemption. Robert Cover
defined "redemptive constitutionalism" as the comprehensive social
vision of a community or association that requires a "transformational
politics that cannot be contained within the autonomous insularity of
the association itself."' 4  Professor Cover traced redemptive
constitutionalism to the evolution of antislavery jurisprudence. Of
course, almost any antislavery legal theory would be redemptive in
the sense of seeking an emancipation from bondage. But Frederick
Douglass's constitutionalism was redemptive in a specifically
constitutional sense. In order to redeem the slave community, the
whole constitutional order must redeem itself, and vice versa. The
Constitution must be read anew with fresh eyes, capable of seeing
that the apologies for slavery were built not on the text itself but on
historical or political claims.'5
Let us return, with these ideas in mind, to Lincoln. His genius in
constitutional theory consisted in the way he turned the constitutional
ethic of creation to a salvific task, the purification and renewal of
constitutional faith. Lincoln not only worked out a relation between
creation and redemption, as every Christian thinker must, but made
that relation the engine of a redemptive constitutionalism. But
precisely because Lincoln's way of relating creation and redemption
preserved the moral significance of the created endowment, Lincoln's
redemptive constitutionalism was not gnostic in the substantive sense,
however much Lincoln depended on the formally gnostic strategy of
retelling creation stories to privilege radical proposals and to relativize
13. PAGELS, supra note 5, at 147.
14. Robert Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 34 (1983).
15. Id. at 38.
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the claims of the orthodox. Indeed, given the sectarian and in-
dividualistic organizational form that gnosticism has typically adopted
(or into which it has been thrust in the brutal battles against heresy),
there is room to doubt whether a gnostic constitutionalism could ever
be a redemptive constitutionalism of the kind described by Cover. 7
C. Gnostic Due Process
It would have been possible for slavery's destruction of ordinary
domestic life to have convinced African-Americans of the desolation
of nature, and for the constitutional vision informed by that ex-
perience to have adopted a gnostic solution to the problem of relating
creation and redemption. The same possibility arose in recent decades
when the United States Supreme Court confronted perplexing
problems about the relation between the person and the body, and
about sexuality, procreation, and the meaning of marriage.
If a gnostic sitting on a court confronting these issues were to
declare openly his or her thoughts, such a judge might begin by
affirming that without saving knowledge, we die. "If one does not
understand how body, which he bears, came into existence, he will
[perish] with it."' 8 Justice Douglas makes no such overt declaration;
but then, if he were truly a gnostic, he could not be expected to cast
his pearls before swine. So he does not quite say, in Griswold, that
averting physical generation is a marital sacrament that expresses the
higher meaning of the texts of liberty and the redemptive triumph of
hidden knowledge over the order of creation.
The gnostic meanings of Douglas's opinion in Griswold surface only
when care is taken to trace the meaning of the famous, although
obscure, references to textual "penumbras" and "emanations," and to
"the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms." These concepts and
themes, alone and especially in combination, have been central to the
expression of Gnostic views about the relation between creation and
redemption. By interpreting Douglas's use of these themes, I offer a
17. Pagels concludes that "[f]ar from legitimizing any institution." certain Gnostic sayings
"direct one instead to oneself-to one's inner capacity to find one's own direction, to the 'light
within."' PAGELS, supra note 5, at 144. Any tendency of Gnostic teachings to put a premium on
inwardness and not on institutional form may have burdened the Gnostic communities with a
comparative disadvantage in their struggles with the Catholic Bishops, who could claim to speak
on behalf of a public institution safeguarding a public tradition. See id.
Douglas's gnostic constitutionalism suffers from a similar comparative disadvantage. While
Douglas spoke for a majority in Griswold, his commitments led him to nurture his "inner
capacity to find [his] own direction," which often enough meant dissent. The hidden meaning
of the texts of liberty congruent with the "light within" did not lend itself to the formation of
a stable majority who could claim to speak on behalf of permanent public meanings.
18. The Dialogue of the Savior 134:11-15, in THE NAG HAMMAD1 LIBRARY IN ENGLISH 250
(James M. Robinson ed., 1990).
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reading of Griswold as a gnostic writing. That reading includes four
main ideas.
First: Douglas, like Lincoln, employs the formally gnostic device of
revising the received creation story in order to privilege a new
account of origins that relativizes an accepted ethic and strengthens
the case for a proposed alternative. Again with Lincoln, Douglas's
revision of the creation narrative stresses the priority of the sacred
marriage. Griswold associates the sacredness of marriage, the privacy
of the bedroom, and the priority, of privacy as a constitutional norm
emanating from the texts of liberty, with the temporal priority of
marriage.
Second: Unlike Lincoln, Douglas rejects an interpretation of
marriage as an order of creation. Griswold is gnostic not only
formally, but substantively. Redemption does not restore but displaces
that with which we are "endowed by our Creator." While nature
supplies the freedom to procreate, the texts of liberty (backdated to
reflect the priority of marriage) supply the freedom not to procreate.
Third: In supplying the freedom not to procreate, the texts of
liberty "emanate." Emanation, understood gnostically, is both a
metaphysical event internal to divinity, and a publication or revelation
of the higher meaning of the text. Taken together, the metaphysical
ramifying of divinity and the hermeneutic that reveals this unfolding
of divinity comprise a redemptive emanation. The body, conceived
constitutionally, is an emanation of the texts of liberty; the word
becomes flesh. To read the texts of liberty correctly is to achieve a
redemptive constitutionalism and to defy the antimetaphysical limits
imposed by constitutional orthodoxy.
Together, these three ideas aspire to rest a redemptive
constitutionalism on gnostic grounds. This aspiration, however, is both
expressed and resisted in Griswold. For the emanations of the text,
according to Douglas, finally form penumbras. It is in these
penumbras, or places of partial shadow, that the zones of privacy are
located. Once the gnostic meaning of these formulations is recovered,
the final element of the reading is obtained.
Fourth: The higher meaning of the texts of liberty is blocked. The
light of emanation subsides into shadow. The liberty to couple with
one another nonprocreatively instantiates not the final redemptive
unfolding of divinity but the need to withhold ourselves from one
another in secrecy. The texts of liberty, in the final analysis, do not
yield up their higher meaning, which remains lost in half-shadowed
obscurity. Nor do our couplings succeed in sublimating mere physical
generation into a higher spiritual regeneration.
The argument proceeds chiefly through the interpretation of texts.
Part II briefly presents the Gnostic themes of emanation and shadow,
[Vol. 7: 97
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and the Johannine idea of the word-become-flesh. 9 Part III then
offers an interpretation of Griswold in the light of these themes. Part
IV relies on William Blake's prophetic poem, "Milton," to identify
respects in which Douglas's achievement was frustrated or incomplete,
and to suggest the lines along which it might be realized and
intensified. In "Milton," Blake brings out the peculiar valorization of
the body in Christian gnosticism, and helps make those ideas available
to Douglas's jurisprudence. In particular, Blake reveals the ambiguity
in Douglas's celebration of "the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms," and retrieves the emanation from the penumbra into
which it has fallen.
Part V returns to the Johannine logos doctrine, and to a Christian
standard by which to judge the nature and scope of Douglas's
achievement.2" The questions here surround the necessary difference
between seeing the word of God and the word of (limited)
humankind as taking human form. Douglas cannot be John, or even
take John as his model, because the constitutional word of which he
is custodian cannot become flesh in the fully Biblical sense, hence
there can be no public constitutional proclamation of redemptive
incarnation. Blake and John offer limiting cases for Christian
interpretations or extensions of Douglas's ideas about the status of the
body. John sets the upper limit. From his evangelical viewpoint, the
incarnation of the word is an achievement of God and not of
humankind. In no way can "we the people" ordain the world-making
word of grace and truth. On no conception of "Constitution" can one
say "and the Constitution was God," and remain within the horizon
of Christian faith. Even the very highest realization of the
19. The nature of the material with which we will be working makes it impossible,
unfortunately, to give each of the main ideas (emanation, shadow, logos, and so on) a fully
independent treatment. From time to time it will be necessary to express one theme in relation
to another, or in connection with larger topics, either mythological or hermeneutic. The reader
interested in a more extensive analysis of the underlying concepts is encouraged to turn to the
studies cited in the notes.
20. Douglas was the son of a Presbyterian minister, and was raised in a devout and
observant Presbyterian home. See Nadine Strossen, The Religion Clause Writings of Justice
William 0. Douglas, in "HE SHALL NOT PASS THIS WAY AGAIN": THE LEGACY OF JUSTICE
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 91, 101 (Stephen L. Wasby ed., 1990) [hereinafter LEGACY]. He made
no secret of this fact, referring to "my own Presbyterians" in his dissent in Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 246 (1972).
In addition to believing that individual rights flowed from some general notions of religion
and a Supreme Being, Douglas also saw them as flowing specifically from the Christian
concepts of God and Jesus. He wrote: "Though our concepts of equity and justice come
from numerous sources, they have been more greatly influenced by Jesus than by anyone
else. The Sermon on the Mount is a charter of political freedom."
Strossen, supra, at 102 (quoting WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC OF LIBERTY 184 (1954)).
Without exaggerating the significance of Christian ethics in Douglas's constitutional
jurisprudence, one may reconstruct the notion of a "penumbra of rights" as an expression of a
Christian insight, and assess its adequacy along those lines.
1995]
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Constitution's promise for the security of the person and the privacy
of "the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms" cannot express the
body's worth and the holiness of marriage as understood within the
reception of the logos-become-flesh.
Blake provides the limiting case of vision that thoroughly expresses
an aspiration to Christian liberty and perfection, while honoring the
Johannine boundary. If Douglas were to follow Blake toward a more
fully realized ideal of the spiritually integrated body, in which the
creative emanations are embraced and reassumed rather than hidden
in the penumbra, he would say as much as a Christian can say about
such matters (and no doubt a great deal more than a judge can say,
at least in a judicial opinion).
The guiding aim of this Essay is to express, so far as this may be
done within Christian premises, Douglas's intimation of a humane and
emancipatory extension of the Constitution's fundamental rights
provisions, unfolding and ramifying the very characteristics of
Griswold that seem to depart farthest from orthodox patterns of
justification in constitutional argument. In treating Griswold as a
gnostic writing, I am adopting an interpretive stance toward Justice
Douglas's opinion that highlights, I believe, the respects in which that
opinion brings us to a constitutional crossroad. The opinion is gnostic
in its aspiration to release and reveal the higher meanings of the texts
of liberty, and in the correlation it draws between an emancipatory
reading, an overcoming of the bonds of the natural or created order,
and an awakening of humankind to the freeing possibilities of a
spiritually reconceived embodiment. It is equally gnostic in the
characteristic failure of these themes, alone and in connection with
one another, to achieve their promise.
If there is nothing in Douglas's background to explain his recourse
to specifically gnostic imagery in a context that suggests gnostic
aspirations, students of Douglas's writing on the Court will recall that
he did avow a more generic spirituality which he associated with
American constitutionalism. Long before expressing his gnostic for-
mulations in Griswold, Douglas declared that "We are a religious
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.",2' The First
Amendment to the United States Constitution, Douglas went on to
21. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). While Douglas came to hold stricter
Establishment Clause views, he never repudiated his Zorach statement; indeed, he quoted it in
later opinions. Strossen, supra note 20, at 100-02. In the same year in which he wrote Zorach,
Douglas embraced the right of privacy as adumbrated by Justice Brandeis, and in that sense
foreshadowed Griswold. See Dorothy J. Glancy, Douglas's Right of Privacy: A Response to His
Critics, in LEGACY, supra note 20, at 155, 156-58. See also infra note 23. Thus it does not seem
inappropriate to associate Douglas's presentation of the right of privacy in Griswold with his
general belief in a spiritual source for the basic democratic and constitutional institutions.
[Vol. 7: 97
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say, accommodates "the spiritual needs of man"; in normative
democratic society, the state "respects the religious nature of our
people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual
needs."22 Douglas agreed with his predecessor, Justice Brandeis, who
stated:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the sig-
nificance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their
emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone-the most conprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. 2F
In short, in addition to having a material nature, we also have a
spiritual nature which requires the cultivation of certain feelings,
intellections, emotions, and sensations. Although these dispositions of
mind can be given physicalist interpretations, Brandeis chooses to
regard them as central to our spiritual nature. Douglas follows
Brandeis here, and again follows Brandeis in conceiving the right to
privacy as essential to fostering these dispositions.
A reading of Griswold, then, which is meant to bring out the
relationship between substantive due process and understandings of
our "spiritual nature," is connected to certain broad lines in the
development of Douglas's ideas. For the same reason, this reading (at
least in its broader outlines) may be squared with the intellectual
history of the right to privacy in the Supreme Court. But any
interpretation of the Griswold-ian side of modern constitutionalism
that brings out its spiritual commitments, whether conceived along
vaguely humanist or specifically gnostic lines, is bound to raise more
questions about legitimacy in constitutional argument than it can hope
to answer, at least in an Article such as this.
22. 343 U.S. at 313-14.
23. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice
Goldberg quotes this passage in his Griswold concurrence, 381 U.S. at 494. Before writing the
Court's opinion in Griswold, Douglas had referred to the "right 'to be let alone"' in his dissent
in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 n.12 (1961), in explaining why the "notion of privacy is not
drawn from the blue" but "emanates from the totality of the constitutional scheme under which
we live." Earlier, Douglas embraced Brandeis's Olmstead dissent when he said that "[t]he right
to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom." Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S.
451, 467 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In his concurrences to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), Douglas continued to honor "the 'right to be
let alone"' and to regard it as central to the freedom of marital and procreative choice. 410 U.S.
at 211 (Douglas, J., concurring).
1995]
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I hope to show here how the language and themes of Griswold
open at every turn a horizon of "spiritual nature" that heightens
appreciation for the burden and the beauty of embodiment. Whether
a constitutional discourse that opens this horizon may stand the test
of legitimacy, on either a political or a Christian standard, must
remain undecided.
II. THE GNOSTIC BACKGROUND
A. The Body as a Publication of the Word
One way in which certain Gnostic writings endow the body with a
surprisingly affirmative meaning in the drama of redemption is by
representing the body as a hypostasis of the "word," the essential unit
of the revelatory and authoritative text. Outside of Gnosticism, of
course, there are any number of ways to "read" the body, from
seeking the hidden causes of parapraxes to heeding the body's
rhythms. But in the Gnostic writings in which I am interested, the
significance of the body (its moral and spiritual relevance) is located
precisely in a bodily extension or realization of the revealed word.
"[T]he Word that is in the heart of those that speak it, has come
forward. It is not just a sound, but it became a body."24
The body manifests or publishes the word, revealing it more fully.
The Gospel of Truth, a Valentinian text, revisits the Passion narrative
to establish this central claim about embodiment.
Since the father of the entirety is invisible-and the entirety
derives from him, from whom every way emanated-Jesus ap-
peared, wrapped himself in that document, was nailed to a piece
of wood, and published the father's edict upon the cross.25
The body of Jesus is, then, a document that publishes that which is
otherwise invisible in the father, "from whom every way emanated."
Publication, in effect, is a compensatory emanation. (We shall see that
Justice Douglas's concept of emanation shares these features. The
constitutional emanation is a visible bodily publication of libertarian
good news, an "edict" otherwise withheld from us.)
The opening verses of the Gospel of John, called the Prologue,
offer a strikingly concise and distinctive formulation of the em-
bodiment of logos. John begins by revising Genesis: "In the beginning
was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was
24. The Gospel of Thomas 26:6-8, in LAYTON, supra note 4, at 257.
25. The Gospel of Truth 20:19-26, in LAYTON, supra note 4, at 255.
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God. 26 The revised creation story enables a Christology: "And the
Word became flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth; we
have beheld his glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father.
27
This affirmation of a certain becoming, not antithetical to divine
being, steers the Gospel of John away from reductive dualisms. The
word-become-flesh raises sarx, the decomposable human materiality,
to the dignity of logos, God's revealed word. While the Biblical body
had always been a vehicle of holiness (in the observance of rules of
abstinence and ritual preparation) and a medium expressing both law
("written in the heart")28 and covenant (circumcision), 29 and had
represented the full range of the human existent called to devotion,
never before had the word of God, through which all was made,
strictly become flesh.
The relation between John and the various Gnostic texts and
traditions is a subject for historical and textual specialists. I will say
only that, in the Prologue, no limit is placed on the audience who
receives the word-become-flesh. The incarnation, the embodying of
the word, is a publication, a making-public, in the widest sense. It has
been characteristic of Christian Gnosticism, however, to regard the
history and drama of the fullness, or pleroma, the emanations within
it, the ultimate descent into cosmos and body, and the redemptive
coming of the word in and through Jesus, as knowledge available only
to the elect or the initiate. One might draw (possibly overdraw) the
contrast by saying that while in the Johannine formulation the word
becomes flesh in the full light of publicity, in the Gnostic version
acquaintance with the redemptive, communicative body is achieved
privately.3" Accordingly, the Christian story of incarnation is as-
26. John 1:1 (Revised Standard Version). Authority for the revision includes Psalm 33:
By the word of the Lord the heavens were made,
and all their host by the breath of his mouth....
For he spoke. and it came to be:
he commanded, and it stood firm.
Psalms 33:6. 9.
27. John 1:14.
28. Jeremiah 31:31-33; cf. Hebrews 8:10; Romans 2:14-15.
29. Genesis 17:1-23; Deuteronomy 10:16; Jeremiah. 9:25; Romans 2:29.
30. John says that the Word is "the light of all the people"; correspondingly, the mission of
John the Baptist was to testify to the coming of "the true light, which enlightens everyone." John
1:4, 9 (emphasis added). A distinction may be drawn between the class of those who are in
principle enlightened by the Word, and the class of those who "receive" the Word and are
thereby given new birth. In John the former class includes all humanity, while the latter class
includes only those "born of God" (1:13) or "born from above" (3:3), and excludes those born
"of blood or of the will of the flesh" (1:13) or "all who ... do not come to the light" (3:20). I
understand the author of the Valentinian text, "The Gospel of Truth," to agree with John that
the class of those who receive the Word includes less than everyone; in the Gnostic text, the
recipient group is called "the perfect" or "the elect." The Gospel of Truth, in LAYTON, supra
note 4, at 254-362. If there is disagreement, it regards the class of those to whom the light comes
in principle. Compare John 1:4, 9, supra, to these Valentinian affirmations: "The proclamation
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sociated with a public hermeneutics, and the Gnostic story with a
private or esoteric hermeneutics.
B. Emanation and Shadow
In Gnostic cosmogonies, emanation is the central concept linking
the original fullness of being and divinity (the pleroma), the word as
its manifestation (the logos), and the descent of the spirit into the
cosmos and the embodied human existent. "This process of
emanation, of the progressive issue of the divine substance, by means
of which God manifests to himself the totality of his infinite poten-
tialities, is a process of enrichment, but also of impoverishment."3
The overflowing of divine fullness sets in motion a sequence of
subordinate emanations, degenerating at last into the creation of the
cosmos and the alienation of spirit. But divine emanation also enables
an ultimate restoration: "In this manner, the Word of the father goes
forth in the entirety ... taking the outward manifestation of the
entirety and purifying it, bringing it back into the father, into the
mother, Jesus of the infinity of sweetness.
32
In one version of the Valentinian cosmology, 33 the unknown God
is envisioned dyadically as the Deep (the perfect, unengendered
parent) and its consort Silence (thought, loveliness). From the womb
of Silence, in which the seed of the Deep is planted, pairs of
masculine and feminine energies (the Aeons) descend. From Silence
emanate Intellect ("the only being that comprehended the magnitude
of its parent"' ) and Truth, which in turn emit Word and Life. "And
from the Word and Life (Z6d) emanated the human being and the
church, as a pair., 35 Five further pairs of Aeons, coupling images of
stability, or unchangeableness, and sexual intercourse, proceed from
of the truth is a joy for those who have received grace through the father of truth, that they
might learn to know him through the power of the Word that emanated from the fullness....
[T]he term 'proclamation' refers to the manifestation of hope, a discovery for those who are
searching for him." The Gospel of Truth 16:31-35, 17:1, in LAYTON, supra note 4, at 253. "It is
to the perfect that this, the proclamation of the one they search for, has made itself known,
through the mercies of the father." Id. at 18:11-14.
31. FILORAMO, supra note 12, at 59.
32. The Gospel of Truth, 23:33-24:9, in LAYTON, supra note 4, at 257 n.17a. Layton glosses
"entirety" as "spiritual reality as alienated from its source." Id.
33. The account given in this paragraph summarizes main features of the myth elaborated
by Valentinus's student Ptolemy, as presented by St. Irenaeus of Lyon in Against Heresies.
Ptolemy's Version of the Gnostic Myth, in LAYTON, supra note 4, at 276-302. While the idea of
an original fullness whose radiance both glorifies the ineffable god and precipitates division and
fall, giving rise to humankind and to the drama of redemption, is common to several versions
of Gnosticism both classical and Christian. these versions also differ in many respects. See id.
at 12-17, 223-24; HANS JONAS, THE GNOSTIC RELIGION 174-97 (1963): PAGELS, supra note 5,
at 59-67; FILORAMO, supra note 12, at 56-100.
34. Ptolemy's Version of the Gnostic Myth line 1.1, in LAYTON, supra note 4, at 281.
35. Id. at 282.
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Word and Life; six further pairs, including the theological virtues,
emanate from human being and church. The last of the twelve to
emanate, Wisdom (Sophia), "charged forward and experienced
passion without the involvement of her consort, the wished-for."36
The fruit of this incomplete and frustrated passion, by an Aeon
incapable of knowing the Deep, is Achamrth (the lower wisdom),
who was "cast forth in a region of shadow and emptiness; and
necessarily so, for it had come to be outside the light and the fullness,
without form and imageless, like an aborted foetus.' '3 7 Jesus comes
from the fullness, and proceeds, as Word, to marry and redeem the
lower wisdom, giving form to Wisdom's formless thought.
From Sophia's abortive effort to think or know the Deep arises the
craftsman or demiurge, creator of cosmos, materiality, and
humankind. In some texts, such as The Reality of the Rulers, the
demiurge is associated with Sophia's shadow.
A veil exists between the world above and the realms (aeons)
that are below; and shadow came into being beneath the veil; and
that shadow became matter; and that shadow was projected
apart. And what she had created became a product in the matter,
like an aborted foetus. And it assumed a plastic form molded out
of shadow, and became an arrogant beast resembling a lion.38
The demiurge, in its arrogance, boasts that it is the creator of heaven
and earth; in fact the creator is but a deformed reproduction of the
full being of the ineffable divinity. By the same logic, humankind,
made in the image and likeness of the creator, is twice degraded, the
shadow of shadow. Caught in a material world likened to afterbirth
of the deformed shadow, humanity (anthropos) is redeemed only by
a saving knowledge that looks beyond Wisdom and beyond the
border of the pleroma. This redemption will not take place "[u]ntil
the moment when the true human being, within a modeled form
[body], reveals the existence of the spirit of truth, which the parent
has sent."39
III. THE SECOND INCORPORATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS
While these teachings are esoteric, their influence on poetry and
theology has been pervasive. However deeply run the streams of
influence, it is nonetheless surprising to recognize central themes of
gnostic cosmogony---emanation, shadow, frustrated procreation, and
36. Ptolemy's Version of the Gnostic Myth line 2.2, in LAYTON, supra note 4, at 283.
37. Ptolemy's Version of the Gnostic Myth line 4.1, in LAYTON, supra note 4, at 288.
38. The Reality of the Rulers (Hypostasis of the Archons) in LAYTON, supra note 4, at 74
(94:8-18).
39. Id. at 76 (96:32) (editorial marks eliminated).
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revelation of the long-hidden meaning of the word-in the modern
constitutional case law of substantive due process.
Writing for the Court in Griswold, Justice Douglas echoes these
central themes of gnostic myth.'° In Griswold, the Court struck down
a Connecticut statute that made it a crime to use any drug or article
to prevent conception. A majority of the Justices agreed that the
statute violated a right of privacy, or of marital privacy, secured by
some provision or provisions of the Constitution. But nowhere is the
word "privacy" to be found in the Constitution,41 nor any discussion
of the incidents of marriage. It is not surprising, then, that Justices
who agreed that the statute was invalid disagreed about just which
portions of the Constitution rendered the statute so.
On the one hand, privacy could be regarded as an element of the
liberty that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution protects against substantive deprivation
by irrational state laws. The difficulty with this line of thought for the
Griswold judges was that precedents for securing families from state
laws intruding on family choices regarding child-raising were clouded
by association with a discredited, long-renounced form of judicial
activism.42 On the other hand, privacy could be found to be implicit
in various provisions of the Constitution, such as those provisions
guaranteeing freedom of association, freedom of the person and home
from unreasonable searches and seizures, and the right not to
incriminate oneself. The difficulty with this approach was that some
of the Justices did not believe that the Fourteenth Amendment fully
"incorporated" all of the relevant provisions of the Bill of Rights,
rendering them applicable against state (as distinct from federal)
laws.43
Douglas's solution was to effect a second "incorporation" of the Bill
of Rights through the due process clause: an incorporation, not only
of text into corpus of text, but also of text into corpus of body.'
40. It is helpful to read the opinion in the light of the ironies surrounding it: that this so-
called "rebirth"-e.g., The Birth of the Second Era of Substantive Due Process, in PAUL BREST
& SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 946 (3rd ed.
1992)-giving rise to case law described as Griswold's "progeny"-see Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstet. and Gyn., 476 U.S. 747, 775 (1986); Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy
Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1436 (1992)-protects contraceptive use (as if doctrinal
procreation stood in for the procreation of the body), and that this new birth of due process
liberty spurns the due process clause and takes its stand instead upon an expansive reading of
the Bill of Rights. Griswold participates in a series of sublimated births.
41. "Private property," however, is protected by the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.
42. Justice Douglas vented his concerns about substantive due process and declined to adopt
the analysis symbolized by Lochner v. New York, 195 U.S. 45 (1905). Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482.
43. 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
44. Corpus means "embodied person," as it does in the writ of habeas corpus, which requires
that the person be brought before the court. The Constitution adopts this language to restrict
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This second incorporation is a saving "publication" of the word of
liberty.45 Justice Black, who dissented in Griswold, is said to have
carried the text of the Constitution with him in his pocket, so that he
could refer to its language as needed. Douglas goes Black one better;
we need not carry the Constitution in our pockets because we bear it
in our bodies.
Once the body incorporates and publishes the meaning of
constitutional liberty, the violation of the person is at once revealed
and denounced as a violation of the Constitution.' The space
common to both violations is "privacy," which is located in the
"penumbra," the half-shadow cast by the provisions of the text. "In
other words, the First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is
protected from governmental intrusion."47 Douglas's language is not
that of logical implication-of more specific protections implying a
more general right-but of spatial extension. The First Amendment
"has a penumbra," casts a partial shadow; what is half-concealed by
that shadow is private, protected from governmental intrusion. Both
the body and the bedroom belong to this concealed space.
After considering several other provisions of the Bill of Rights,
together with cases interpreting them, Douglas concludes: "specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance."'" Here Douglas brings together two central concepts of
gnostic cosmogony, the emanation and the shadow. The word, the
language of the text, emanates, thereby participating in the ambiguous
process by which logos emanates in the pleroma. The emanation of
the word brings life: "[A]nd the word was with God.... All things
came into being through him.... What has come into being in him
was life, and the life was the light of all people."49 But instead of
bringing light, this emanation brings shadow, the penumbra's half-
concealment. Thus the process of emanation is revealed in all its
the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
45. See supra text accompanying note 25.
46. The wording of Clause 1 of the Fourth Amendment invites this interpretation. It
provides that "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons ... shall not be violated."
The word "violated," unlike, say, "impair" (contracts clause), or "abridging" (Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment), participates simultaneously in a phenomenology of em-
bodiment (conveying the invasion of the person) and in a discourse of rights. (Such an invasion,
at least when "unreasonable," infringes "the right of the people.")
The Fourth Amendment's concept of person requires embodiment (else the security of the
person cannot be violated), just as Article I's concept of corpus, see supra note 44, refers to the
person. The two vocabularies converge in treating the person. at least in standard instances, as
the living body.
47. 381 U.S. at 483.
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ambiguity; what begins as a radiation of full being culminates in a
shadowy abortion. The word emanates into the fallen state of
materiality.
The jurisprudential counterpart to this shadowy space is uncertain-
ty. Not long before Douglas wrote his Griswold opinion, H. L. A.
Hart had given wide currency to "penumbra" as a term denoting the
area of uncertainty in a word's meaning and legal application,
surrounding the "core" of certainty.5" Long before Hart, Justice
Holmes had spoken of "questions of penumbra, of shadowy marches
where it is difficult to decide."'" In the shadowy marches of
materiality, anxiety, and the indefinite are the rule.52 When Justice
Cardozo spoke of the "penumbra of uncertainty obscuring
judgment,"53 he clearly drew the consequences of the shadow image;
for if it is in the nature of a complete shadow to eclipse, it is in the
nature of a penumbra, a partial shadow, to obscure-and the mental
state of the judge corresponding to obscurity is uncertainty.
Prior to Griswold, Douglas himself had used "penumbra" in this
imagistically appropriate sense, that is, the sense that corresponds to
"partial shadow." Addressing the question of whether the state of
50. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 119 (1961); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 610 (1958).
51. Hanover Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 404, 426 (1916) (Holmes, J., concurring). This
is the earliest use of the term "penumbra" that I have found in a case decided by the Supreme
Court. Holmes meant by "penumbra" in the Hanover Milling case what he had meant years
earlier when, as Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, he had observed that
"constitutional rules, like those of common law, end in a penumbra where the Legislature has
a certain freedom in fixing the line." Danforth v. Groton Water Co., 178 Mass. 472, 476 (1901).
Later, dissenting in Olmstead, Holmes said: "I am not prepared to say that the penumbra of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments covers the defendant, although I fully agree that Courts are apt
to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law where those words import a policy that goes
beyond them." 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Here the image of the
"shadowy marches" is recalled; the penumbra of the text is imaged as a shadow that either
"covers the defendant" or falls short of him. The question of whether or not the shadow covers
him is likewise shadowy; we can agree that "the words of a law" have a meaning that extends
beyond them. but disagree about what that meaning is and how it applies to the instant case.
For the history of the legal use of "penumbra," see Burr Henly, Penumbra: The Roots of a
Legal Metaphor. 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 81 (1987). See also Henry Greely, A Footnote to
"Penumbra" in Griswold v. Connecticut, 6 CONST. COMMENTARY 251 (1989) (criticizing
Douglas's use of metaphor).
52. The material world, according to one account of the Valentinian creation myth, "was
generated from three kinds of passion: fear; grief; uncertainty." Ptolemy's Version of the Gnostic
Myth 1.5.4, in LAYTON, supra note 4. at 291. The body resides within this penumbra of
uncertainty:
Inasmuch as the entirety had searched for the one from whom they had emanated, and the
entirety was inside of him-the inconceivable uncontained, who is superior to all
thought-ignorance of the father caused agitation and fear. And the agitation grew dense
like a fog, so that no one could see. Thus error found strength and labored at her matter
in emptiness. Without having learned to know the truth, she took up residence in a
modeled form [the human body], preparing by means of the power, in beauty, a substitute
for truth.
The Gospel of Truth 16:4-21, in LAYTON, supra note 4, at 253. Cf. supra note 32.
53. Schechter Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1934) (Cardozo, J., concurring).
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Louisiana could, under its own law, confiscate timber without paying
compensation, Douglas observed: "There is no square holding of the
Louisiana courts on this point. The problem lies in the penumbra of
Louisiana law, making all the more difficult a prediction as to what
the Louisiana courts would hold."'
Read as a gnostic text, Douglas's Griswold opinion is striking in its
use of the image of partial shadow to convey uncertainty and
obscurity, the characteristic qualities of the material world. The
constitutional word of liberties casts a shadow; it does not emit a
radiance." Within that shadow we are free to choose and to act,
both maritally and judicially, but not in confidence that we are
achieving a higher realization of the human. Above all, the shadow of
the text is a place of privacy, not publicity. The incorporation of the
Bill of Rights into the body is visible only through an esoteric
hermeneutic; there is no line of justification that can vindicate or
secure this incorporation through a public reading of the text. To see
this, we must turn from the penumbra to the emanations that form it.
In its original usage, emanation as a concept of constitutional law
referred to the political legitimation of governmental authority. Chief
Justice Marshall used the concept in this way in a well-known passage
from McCulloch v. Maryland.56
The government of the Union, then, (whatever may be the
influence of this fact on the case,) is, emphatically, and truly, a
government of the people. In form and in substance it emanates
from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be
exercised directly on them, and for their benefit.57
The claim here seems so self-evident that it is easy for a modern
reader to glide over the reference to emanation without being
troubled by its uncertain meaning. Not only the content but the
rhetoric of the claim has seeped into our public mythology by means
of the Gettysburg Address, which repeats Marshall's assertion that the
federal government is the "government of the people," "by" the
54. General Box Co. v. United States, 351 U.S. 159, 169 (1955) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
55. The imagery does not lend itself to happy allegorization. In Charles Reich's cheery
reconstruction, "Douglas argued that the rights explicitly enumerated have broader meanings
today; in his memorable phrase, they have penumbras. They mark an area larger than
themselves. They are like street lights illuminating a darkened street, the whole of the street
representing liberty, the lights being only those aspects of liberty marked out by the Framers."
Charles Reich, Foreword: "He Shall Not Pass This Way Again," in LEGACY, supra note 20, at
xii. Yet in Douglas's phrase, the emanations form the penumbras, rather than partially dispelling
them. Further, Reich's night scene does not retain the association between the penumbra and
the private, impenetrable precinct of the bedroom. The whole point of the half-shadow of
privacy formed by the text's emanations is that one does not want the full light of day to fall
there.
56. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
57. Id. at 404-05 (emphasis added).
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people, and "for" the people. But Marshall makes these claims
precisely because they are not self-evident: "counsel for the State of
Maryland have deemed it of some importance, in the construction of
the constitution, to consider that instrument not as emanating from
the people, but as the act of sovereign and independent States."58
The nature and distribution of sovereignty, and the question of its
divisibility, were contested throughout the period of the framing and
ratification of the Constitution. McCulloch testifies to the fact that
adoption of the Constitution did not settle the matter.
Maryland's contention implies that grants of sovereign power ought
to be construed narrowly. Congress's powers, accordingly, should be
interpreted in favor of the sovereign grantor (the states) and against
the grantee (Congress). In order to bring the power to incorporate a
bank within the delegated powers of Congress, Marshall had to read
the whole corpus of enumerated powers in the light of an implicit
larger purpose, the prosperity of the growing nation, which the powers
were meant to advance. 9 He did not describe this method of
interpretive generalization and inference as "emanating" the text, or
discerning its "emanations." "Emanation" named the relation of
political legitimacy between the people and the federal government,
not the hermeneutic subordinate to that relation.
For the greater part of its constitutional history, the concept of
emanation has stayed in the neighborhood of Marshall's robust idea.
The Constitution is said to emanate from the people; so, too, does the
sovereign power.' ° Laws emanate from the sovereign; the authority
of law emanates from the people.6' A regulation emanates from
legislative authority; an Act of Congress emanates from its delegated
powers.62 In all of these uses, emanation means the political
legitimation of an exercise of power. Because judging is such an
exercise, it too must be legitimated. "It is the authority and laws
58. Id. at 402.
59. Id. at 407.
60. See Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 544 (1923) (stating that Constitution
emanates from the people); Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. 449, app. xi (1841) (counsel contending
that "[t]he formation of the constitution of a state is an act of sovereign power emanating
directly from the people").
61. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 390 (1947) (holding that states cannot consider federal
laws as emanating from foreign sovereign); United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 700 (1964)
(holding that state judges exercise and enforce authority and laws emanating from the people).
62. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 112 (1804) (counsel contending
municipal regulation emanates from municipal authority of nation); United States v. Bryan and
Woodcock, 13 U.S. 374, 376 (1815) (counsel arguing that inappropriate regulation cannot
emanate from Necessary and Proper Clause).
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emanating from the people, which the judges sit to exercise and
enforce.
63
Marshall needed to appeal to the emanation of legitimating energy
from the people because he had to justify his broad construction of
the constitutional texts of federal power. He could make this appeal
because it sounded in a widely held, if equally widely disputed,
political theory. And he could talk the language of emanation with
confidence because he knew he could communicate his vision of great
works by a great government for a great people. That which had to
be said could be said "emphatically, and truly," because a sound
(though controversial) political vision effectively guaranteed the
meaningfulness of the otherwise obscure claim that legitimation
"emanates" from its source.
Douglas's constitutional emanationism departs from Marshall's by
displacing the concept of emanation from its function in the political
theory of the delegation of sovereign power. For Douglas, emanation
names that which comes forth from the text rather than that which
comes forth from the people. A certain similarity of interpretive
method, however, survives this distinction. Regarded as an exercise in
generalization, Douglas's hermeneutics of rights resembles Marshall's
hermeneutics of powers. In both, a general principle or purpose is
teased out of a series of related constitutional provisions, and that
more general principle or purpose then serves as a premise in
reasoning to a conclusion about the instant case. But in Douglas's
hands, "emanation" serves to call attention to that which must be
justified, rather than to rationalize a political argument.
Lacking the tether to a generally negotiable political argument,
Douglas's emanation appears to be mystical or free-floating. Douglas
reacts to this appearance defensively in Poe v. Ullman.64 Dissenting
from the Court's decision that a challenge to Connecticut's contracep-
tive ban was nonjusticiable, Douglas adumbrates the concepts he will
bring to his majority opinion in Griswold four years later. "This
notion of privacy is not drawn from the blue. It emanates from the
totality of the constitutional scheme under which we live." 65 Because
he has nothing robust to say on behalf of his emanationism, he
renounces defensively the very language that the gnostic might
63. See Watson v. Williams, 36 Miss. 331, 341-42 (1858), quoted in United States v. Barnett,
376 U.S. 681, 700 (1963).
64. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
65. Id. at 521 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). In this passage, Douglas traces the
emanation not to the larger implications of specific constitutional provisions, but to the whole
text and more. (The "constitutional scheme under which we live" may comprise not only the
whole text but the range of traditions and dispositions that surround it.) Compare Douglas's
claim, elsewhere in the same opinion, that "'[l]iberty' is a conception that sometimes gains
content from the emanations of other specific guarantees." Id. at 517.
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employ creatively. If the emanation does not proceed upward from
the people, as it did for Marshall, then perhaps it is "drawn from the
blue," descending from the pleroma as conceived in the imagination.
Likewise in Bell v. Maryland,' sandwiched between Ullman and
Griswold, struggling to explain why the emanations do not require the
conclusion that the private owner of a restaurant can discriminate
against black customers, Douglas refers to the Fourth Amendment's
"aura of privacy around private interests., 67 Douglas speaks ar-
ticulately and passionately in denouncing this discrimination as
"apartheid,"' but has nothing of comparable insight to say about the
content and justification of the zone of privacy. By characterizing the
emanation as an "aura," he gestures toward a mystical emanationism.
But he does not do more than gesture, and this gesture may do more
to raise doubts than to quiet them.
Bringing together the concepts of penumbra and emanation, we
now see how appropriate it is for Douglas to describe the text's
emanations as forming a shadowy place of uncertainty. No jus-
tification is offered for the text's emanation in this or that direction,
or to any particular extent, or indeed for emanation at all. The
absence of such a justification is felt as doubt, an uneasy existence in
the "shadowy marches." Marshall's confidence in arranging the bits
of textual tile into a larger and more meaningful mosaic is lost. That
does not mean, however, that Douglas is the lesser creator. Griswold
is creative but incomplete or not fully realized; the artist resists, rather
than embraces, the conclusion that his emanations are "drawn from
the blue." Resisting, his "Emanation scatter'd thro' the deep / In
torment,"69 Douglas retires into the penumbra of privacy.
IV. REDEEMING THE EMANATIONS
A. "The vast breach of Milton's descent"7°
We have seen that, for Justice Douglas, a visionary reading of the
texts of liberty is one that incorporates the higher meaning of those
texts in the body and the bedroom. No longer a merely external law,
the Constitution dwells among us, fundamentally freeing us. But what
promises to be a wider publication of hidden meanings actually
confirms the inevitability of concealment and obscurity. The
66. 378 U.S. 226 (1963).
67. Id. at 254.
68. Id. at 254.
69. WILLIAM BLAKE, Milton, bk. 1, plate 2, lines 19-20 [hereinafter Milton], in COMPLETE
WRITINGS 481 (Geoffrey Keynes ed., 1972).
70. "But Milton entering my Foot, I saw in the nether / Regions of the Imagination ... the
vast breach of Milton's descent." Id., bk. 1, plate 21, lines 4-5, 7, at 503.
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emanation of the texts of liberty forms a penumbra, a half-shadowy
place of doubt. Protected by the shadows, the bodies in the bedroom
couple ungeneratively.
Taken as a gnostic writing, Douglas's opinion in Griswold reports
the mythic prehistory in which the emanation lapses into shadow.
What is needed, from a gnostic point of view, is to go on with the
story, constantly bringing out the possibility that the emanation may
be redeemed from the shadow of concealed meaning, anxiety, and un-
generativity into which it has been cast. In this section I will call upon
William Blake, the great intensifier of the Christian gnostic
imagination, to resume the narrative as he did in his prophetic
books.7" Especially in "Milton," Blake sets out to rescue the fallen
or alienated emanation Of the creative genius, retrieving for
humankind a more delineated depiction and celebration of the
imaginative body. Douglas's emanations invite a comparably visionary
rescue attempt.
Milton, as understood by Blake, was just such a visionary figure as
Douglas, renewing the old creation stories with an eye toward the
redemption that overcomes or realizes them, fathering emanations
that promise emancipation but subside into captivity.72 In Eternity,
Milton is moved by the advent of new poetic possibility to descend,
to enter Blake inspirationally, and to initiate the redemption of his
emanations, their restorative reunion with the divine body.73
But Milton entering my Foot, I saw in the nether
Regions of the Imagination .... the vast breach of Milton's
descent....
And all this Vegetable World appear'd on my left Foot
As a bright sandal form'd immortal of precious stones & gold.
I stooped down & bound it on to walk forward thro' Eternity.74
Milton had his Blake; who shall play Blake to Justice Douglas?
Who will raise Douglas up until he declares, with the redeemed
71. In the next section, I will return to the sense in which Douglas's Spectre is specifically
a shadow of privacy. It will be necessary to consider Douglas's understanding of the privacy of
the marital bedroom in the light of gnostic ideas about the bridal chamber and of Blake's
treatment of the ambiguities of Beulah, the married land.
72. Apart from how Milton appeared, and Douglas might have appeared, in Blake's eyes,
the Puritan author of the Areopagitica and the Presbyterian author of so many judicial opinions
in defense of civil freedoms shared a motivation to speak out on behalf of Christian liberty, as
exercised robustly by the individual.
73. "What moves Milton is in the first place his realization that his own vision needs to be
reseen. He has left behind him in the torment of unredeemed nature his Emanation.. . . Milton
must descend in order to redeem his creations...." HAROLD BLOOM, BLAKE'S APOCALYPSE
308-09 (1963).
74. Milton, bk. 1, plate 21, lines 4-5, 7, 12-14, supra note 69, at 503.
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Milton, "And every Generated Body in its inward form / Is a garden
of delight & a building of magnificence"?75
In an examination of Blake's work Harold Bloom explains that:
An emanation is literally what comes into being from a process
of creation in which a series of effluxes flow from a creator. As
a created form an emanation can be male or female or both;
either way it is opposed to the Spectre or shadow, a baffled
creation or residue of self that has failed to emanate, to reach an
outer but connected existence.76
Douglas's "penumbra of privacy," read gnostically, becomes what
Blake called the Spectre, "a protective shadow whose 'guarding' has
become an ambiguous menace."" In Douglas, the emanations form
the shadow, rather than (as in Blake) contesting it.
78
We may adopt Blake's call to a more complete realization of mus-
culature and sensation as a proposal for redeeming Douglas's
emanations from their shadowy exile. Blake offers an inviting account
of a human body that rises above its lower or merely natural endow-
ment as created entity, humanizing itself in and through an increase
in imaginative art. Blake's anthropos, "The Eternal Great Humanity
Divine,, 79 offers an ideal type of the human body improved by
complete incorporation of a Constitution no longer limited either by
the interpretive framework of orthodox constitutionalism or by the
naturalistic metaphysics of the ethic of creation.
As an artist, Blake set himself against forms of painting that
sacrificed clear delineation of corporeal form to shadows and
obscurity. In a catalogue entry describing his aims in executing an
experimental illustration to Milton's Paradise Lost, Blake denounced
"that infernal machine called Chiaro Oscuro, in the hands of Venetian
and Flemish Demons," and renounced "temptations and pertur-
bations, labouring to destroy Imaginative power," which "cause that
the execution shall be all blocked up with brown shadows. They put
75. Id., bk. 1, plate 26, lines 31-32, at 512.
76. BLOOM, supra note 73, at 195.
77. Quoted in HAROLD BLOOM, THE VISIONARY COMPANY 285 (1971).
78. Blake suggests the terms of this contest in a poem from his Note-book:
My Spectre around me night & day
Like a Wild beast guards my way.
My Emanation far within
Weeps incessantly for my sin.
Milton, supra note 69, at 415. The Spectre "guards [one's] way" in an ironic sense, limiting one's
freedom like a wild beast that always threatens, so that I must carefully watch my step. One's
Emanation weeps for the sin of not fully giving creative release (the Emanation remains "far
within"). Id.
79. Milton, bk. 1, plate 2, 1. 8, supra note 69, at 481.
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the original artist in fear and doubt of his own original conception."8
Obscurity prevents sublimity of conception and execution. The
shadow is the Spectre of art, as the penumbra is the Spectre of
jurisprudence, casting creative thought into fear and doubt.
For Blake, the only cure is through a more careful and precise
delineation of the vision, dispelling all fearful vagueness. As Blake
says in another catalogue entry:
The Prophets describe what they saw in Vision as real and
existing men, whom they saw with their imaginative and immortal
organs; the Apostles the same; the clearer the organ the more
distinct the object. A Spirit and a Vision are not, as the modern
philosophy supposes, a cloudy vapour, or a nothing: they are
organized and minutely articulated beyond all that the mortal
and perishing nature can produce. He who does not imagine in
stronger and better lineaments, and in stronger and better light
than his perishing, mortal eye can see, does not imagine at all.8
Blake could be speaking of Douglas and to him when he goes on to
say: "Moderns wish to draw figures without lines, and with great and
heavy shadows; are not shadows more unmeaning than lines, and
more heavy? 0 who can doubt this!"82
Blake invites Douglas to a more clearly articulated vision of the
body, freed from shadowy suggestion. In this respect a Blakean
critique of Griswold coincides with the usual critique; what is needed
is a more carefully delineated right, corresponding to a more minutely
interpreted text and a more precisely defined regime of bodily
liberty.83 But where the usual critic wants Douglas to retire from
prophecy to a more legitimate interpretive stance, Blake beckons
80. WILLIAM BLAKE, A Descriptive Catalogue of Pictures, No. 9, in COMPLETE WRITINGS
582 (Geoffrey Keynes ed., 1972).
81. Id. at 576 (No. 4)
82. Id. at 577.
83. Douglas's concurrence in Roe v. Wade marks in some respects, but not in others, an
advance toward this goal. In his concurrence, Douglas identifies three classes of liberty interests
protected substantively by the due process clause:
First is the autonomous control over the development and expression of one's intellect,
interests, tastes, and personality.... Second is freedom of choice in the basic decisions of
one's life respecting marriage, divorce, procreation, contraception, and the education and
upbringing of children .... Third is the freedom to care for one's health and person,
freedom from bodily restraint or compulsion, freedom to walk, stroll, or loaf.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 210-15 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (writing one concurrence for both cases). By comparison with most opinion-writing
in the area of personal liberty, this inventory of interests, together with its supporting discussion
of precedent, rises to a level of comprehensiveness seldom seen. But Douglas remains silent
about the human good that is to be achieved, or not achieved, in marriage or strolling.
"Freedom from bodily restraint" is not stated with sufficient particularity to justify the adoption
of a standard of review; one must know more about the significance of the body in order to




Garet: Gnostic Due Process
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1995
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 7: 97
toward a more thoroughgoing and ambitious prophecy. The body
must be drawn in all particularity and in full light, improving on
nature through increase of perceptual power, overcoming fatal
dualism. Blake achieves this by means of the engraver's art: "[Tihe
notion that man has a body distinct from his soul is to be expunged;
this I shall do by printing in the infernal method, by corrosives, which
in Hell are salutary and medicinal, melting apparent surfaces away,
and displaying the infinite that was hid."' Douglas must use
analytical corrosives with care, lest they further disfigure the
infinite.' But he can follow Blake the painter in more carefully
delineating the body, reclaiming on its behalf the open horizon of
perceptual possibility.
86
The restoration or improvement of the senses defines one of the
main aims of a renewed incorporation. Joy and delight, accessible
through the portals of sensation, and made available to the intellect,
constitute a medium that unites body and soul, bridging what the
jurisprudence of privacy has described as material and spiritual
nature.87 A more fully realized jurisprudence of gnostic due process
would identify aspects of perceptual potential that form a part of the
liberty of the body.
In Blake's myth, the shadow that falls upon the senses, limiting
their perceptual range and hindering poetic and artistic execution, is
dispelled by the prophet, conceived as a laboring smith:
Los beheld undaunted, furious,
His heav'd Hammer; he swung it round & at one blow
In unpitying ruin driving down the pyramids of pride,
Smiting the Spectre on his Anvil & the integuments of his Eye
And Ear unbinding in dire pain, with many blows
Of strict severity self-subduing, & with many tears labouring.'
Through these self-transformative hammer blows, the smith challenges
and redeems the work of the demiurgic craftsman.
In constitutional law, the labors of the smith, the artist, the
engraver, and the poet, devolve in the first instance upon the justices
84. The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, plate 14, in BLAKE, supra note 80, at 154.
85. Following Holmes, the legal realists (among whom Douglas can be numbered), proposed
"to redefine supernatural concepts in natural terms, to wash ideas in cynical acid." Felix Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 CoLUM. L. REV. 809,830 (1935). This
naturalizing conceptual reductionism defines the opposite of Blake's corrosive method. Blake
wanted to wash away the regime of natural appearances, so as to reveal what Cohen regarded
as "supernatural" but what Blake understood as fully human.
86. Blake denounced the fallen or restricted powers of the five senses. See Milton, bk. 1,
plate 5, lines 19-37, supra note 69, at 484-85. Cleansed, the senses would perceive the union of
body and soul. The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, plate 4, in BLAKE, supra note 80, at 149.
87. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
88. Jerusalem, plate 91, lines 42-47, in BLAKE, supra note 80, at 738.
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of the Supreme Court, although in a larger sense "we the people"
retain all of these works in our own hands. The hammer that forges
and frees, the pen and brush that delineate, the corrosives that wash
away appearances, the strong poetic line that opens a vision of
possibility and beauty-we wield all of these when we expound the
Constitution. If our hands are subtle and our imaginations capable, we
may challenge and redeem the work of the Founders. Griswold issues
such a challenge and intimates such a redemption, but Douglas
supplies neither a subtlety nor an imagination adequate to the
prophetic task.
Vagueness in execution is not essential to Griswold's vision. To the
contrary, any reader of Griswold who shares that vision, as I do,
wishes for the penumbra of uncertainty to give way to a more definite
articulation of the perceptual range which extends our human
possibility beyond the merely natural. We await the redemptive return
of Douglas, as Blake invited the return of Milton; we await a more
careful delineation of body that each of us bears and is, an emanation
of constitutional freedom.
B. In "the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms"
1. The ambiguities of Beulah
The "zone of privacy" is the emanation of the word into the body.
The government violates the word when it violates the body, but
because the site of violation is in partial shadow, the judicial
intelligence falls into uncertainty and difficulty. The word does not
emanate fruitfully. To these characteristics of the "penumbra of
privacy" must be added a final predicate: this zone of inviolability also
comprises what Douglas calls "the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms."'89 The theme of the sacred marriage and of its protected
space, the marital bedroom, is central to the gnostic reading of
Griswold. While some forms of contraceptives are used more or less
continuously (rather than employed ad hoc at the time of inter-
course), and while intercourse may take place in spaces other than the
marital bedroom, the scene that Douglas conjures in Griswold consists
of married persons, in their bedrooms, using devices to avert
conception. The gnostic effect of Douglas's appeal to the "sacred
precincts" is thus to invert the conventional valuation. The marital
space is sacred precisely because it is the place where couples choose
to enact their intimacy nonprocreatively.
89. Griswold. 381 U.S. at 485.
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Ambiguities of creativity link two of Griswold's tropes: the
surprising image of the emanation-turned-shadow and the paean to a
sacred marital space where conception is avoided. Renunciation of
procreation is a meaningful spiritual choice on gnostic (as on many
other) assumptions.' Blake's prophet Los expresses the underlying
idea compactly when he spurns what he regards as a vegetative and
nurturing existence "Lest the Sexual Generation swallow up
Regeneration. '" 9' Yet the act of warding off conception also sym-
bolizes a failure to emanate fully,' or a victory by the "guardian"
Spectre in divorcing the emanative creation from redemptive
reassumption in the creator. The savior's song that opens Blake's epic,
"Jerusalem," implies that marital happiness depends upon a
retirement into shadow that conceals the couple, not only from the
tiresome world, but also from divine insemination or fecundity.
Where hast thou hidden thy Emanation, lovely Jerusalem,
From the vision and fruition of the Holy-one?
I am not a God afar off, I am a brother and friend;
Within your bosoms I reside, and you reside in me:
Lo! we are One, forgiving all Evil, Not seeking recompense.
Ye are my members, 0 ye sleepers of Beulah, land of shades!93
Albion, Blake's anthropos, has produced lovely Jerusalem, his
emanation, and hidden her away from divine vision and fruition.
Resting in the pleasant married land, Beulah, Albion is lulled by soft
shadows into forgetfulness that he is part of the divine body.
Blake's Beulah, recalling Isaiah's married land,94 "is a pleasant
90. The ancient Thomas tradition depicts Jesus saying to a couple who are about to be
married: "If you abandon this filthy intercourse, you become holy temples, pure and free from
afflictions and pains both manifest and hidden, and you will not be girt about with cares for life
and children, the end of which is destruction." Acts of Thomas 12. in WAYNE MEEKS, THE
ORIGINS OF CHRISTIAN MORALITY: THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES 137 (1993). All "intercourse
for production of children" is condemned. Id.
Douglas does not express a view in Griswold on the question of whether married couples, in
their sacred space, the bedroom, should enact their intimacy and community procreatively or
nonprocreatively. Earlier, writing for the Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942),
Justice Douglas explained that a state law requiring sterilization of certain classes of repeat
offenders must be subjected to close judicial scrutiny because it involves "one of the basic civil
rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of
the race." A compulsorily sterilized person can look forward to "no redemption," because "[h]e
is forever deprived of a basic liberty." Id. at 541.
91. Jerusalem, ch. 4, plate 90, line 37, in BLAKE, supra note 80, at 737. Cf. Milton, bk. 2,
plate 31, line 19, supra note 69, at 520.
92. The Gnostic teacher and poet, Valentinus, imaged the harvest of redemptive emanation
as "Crops rushing forth from the deep / A babe rushing forth from the womb." Summer Harvest
6-7, in LAYTON, supra note 4, at 248. The "Crops rushing forth from the deep" are emanations
from the heart or source of the pleroma; "A babe rushing forth from the womb" suggests the
Incarnation, the redemptive emanation, or "procession of the divine Word." Id. at 246.
93. Jerusalem, ch. 1, plate 4, lines 16-21, in BLAKE, supra note 80, at 622.
94. Isaiah 62:4. For a helpful discussion of the ambiguities of Beulah, see JEAN H.
HAGSTRUM, THE ROMANTIC BODY: LOVE AND SEXUALITY IN KEATS. WORDSWORTH, AND
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lovely Shadow / Where no dispute can come." 95 There the
emanations are covered by "a pleasant Mild Shadow above, beneath,
& on all sides round,"' a protective covering that dulls contrariety
and imaginative progression. Although marriage conventionally
symbolizes a union of persons, Blake's shadowy marital land is a
space in which the self may be secured against communion.97
Communion is possible only among persons who have acknowledged
their imaginative energies and accepted responsibility for the exercise
of their imaginative powers.98 The integration of human faculties
required for the building of Jerusalem presupposes the commitment
that Blake expresses in the well-known poem that prefaces "Milton":
"I will not cease from Mental Fight / Nor shall my Sword sleep in my
hand." 99 In Beulah, mental fight relapses into a sleepy and pleasant
restfulness.
In the totality of a well-ordered life, such restfulness is tonic. One
cannot be fully creative and involved in the clash of contraries at
every moment. Beulah mitigates self-absorption, moreover, even if it
does not suffice for communion." And sexual pleasure in marriage
prefigures paradise. Yet Blake helps us to appreciate the implications
for all the human goods, and especially for spirituality, of the
association that Griswold forges between the marital space, the
shadow that covers the emanation, and nonprocreativity. Unless the
prospects for human realization are carefully delineated, and the gates
of perception opened to take in the beauties of the human form, one
who retires into the penumbra of privacy surrounding the marital
bedroom is not thereby stimulated toward a more complete eman-
cipation of the "spiritual nature." The task we face, then, in
redeeming Griswold's promise of a humanizing incorporation, is one
of coming to an understanding of fruition that can inform our
experience of bodily intimacy.
BLAKE 109-45 (1985).
95. Milton, bk. 2, plate 30. lines 2-3. supra note 69, at 518.
96. Id., bk. 2, plate 30, lines 32-33, at 519.
97. Compare Blake's earlier association of the epithets "Obscure, shadowy, void, solitary,"
in The Book of Urizen, plate 2, line 4. in BLAKE, supra note 80, at 222. The poem continues:
"Lo, a shadow of horror is risen / In Eternity! Unknown, unprolific, / Self-clos'd, all-repelling."
Id., plate 3, lines 1-3, at 222. Note the association of the shadow, not only with obscurity, see
supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text, but also with solitariness and sterility.
98. Jerusalem, ch. 4, plate 88, lines 10-15, in BLAKE, supra note 80, at 733.
99. Milton, plate 1, prefatory poem, lines 13-14, supra note 69, at 481.
100. Hagstrum helpfully shows that while Beulah is not sufficient for the highest human
good, it is nonetheless valuable. HAGSTRUM, supra note 94, at 131.
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2. "The right to be let alone"
Griswold offers a revision of the received constitutional creation
myth. In this respect, Griswold deserves comparison to the
preeminent retelling of the creation myth in American
constitutionalism: Lincoln's Gettysburg Address. Both texts are
formally gnostic, in that they take us behind and before ostensible
origins in order to reveal not only the legitimacy but also the priority
of specific aspirations and commitments. For both texts these
aspirations and commitments are redemptive. Griswold, like the
Gettysburg Address, is meant to stimulate a "new birth of freedom."
In both texts, the stimulus to new and higher liberty acquires
strength from paradox, contrast, and substitution. In Lincoln's speech,
the new birth of freedom substitutes for the death of the soldiers. In
Douglas's Griswold opinion, the new birth of freedom substitutes for
the births averted by contraception. Lincoln's pattern of substitution
is more conventional than Douglas's, as is his appeal to marriage as
the symbol of constitutional fidelity and generativity. Nonetheless,
Douglas's disturbing association between marital privacy and
frustrated procreativity is prefigured, surprisingly, in Lincoln's own
remarks.
The Address begins with a formally gnostic move. Lincoln pushes
back the founding, revealing that what had previously seemed to be
the creation was actually a subordinate event. Before there was a
Constitution, there was a Declaration of Independence, whose
commitment to the principle of the equality of the created is traceable
to the hierogamic union of the fathers and the continent: "[O]ur
fathers brought forth on this continent, a new nation, conceived in
Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created
equal."'' Committing the bodies fallen on the fields of Gettysburg
to the soil on which the fathers begat the nation recalls and repeats
the fruitful union, issuing in "a new birth of freedom."'" This whole
salvation-history, which telescopes the constitutional founding into
Jefferson's more distant creation event, and that event into Genesis
(all men are created equal, and endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights), is invisible to the orthodox constitutionalist. Chief
Justice Taney, the representative of orthodox constitutionalism,
misunderstands and misuses the Constitution precisely because he is
ignorant of the larger drama of creation and redemption in which that
101. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at




Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol7/iss1/6
Garet
text figures. Betraying Taney's ignorance is his mistaken assertion, in
the Dred Scott case, that the union is formed by the Constitution.
10 3
Lincoln takes pains in his First Inaugural to correct Taney's error.
Once again, Lincoln uses marital imagery to reveal the more
spiritually significant origin that is half-reflected, half-concealed
behind the demiurgic Constitution.
The Union is much older than the Constitution. It was formed,
in fact, by the Articles of Association in 1774. It was matured
and continued by the Declaration of Independence in 1776. It
was further matured and the faith of all the then thirteen States
expressly plighted and engaged that it should be perpetual, by
the Articles of Confederation in 1778. And finally, in 1787, one
of the declared objects for ordaining and establishing the
Constitution, was "to form a more perfect union.""1o
The deed of constitution making is likened to the pledging of
perpetual faith. An exchange of vows, as between lovers, both
reenacts and deepens the hierogamic origins of the nation's
constitutional order. Marriage is a sacrament of constitutionalism:
specifically, of fidelity as a first principle of union.
For Douglas, too, marriage is a sacrament of constitutionalism. The
moral content of the sacrament is not fidelity, however, but privacy.
Douglas says that before there was a Constitution, there was a right
of privacy:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights-older than our political parties, older than our school
system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse,
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.
It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a
harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble
a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.0 5
The sacred marriage sacramentalizes moral relations so that they are
prior in a double sense: historically prior to the Constitution and
morally prior to values and claims arising in the ordinary affairs of
government. Marriage so sacralizes the right to privacy that it is even
prior to "our prior decisions." But marriage in Griswold cannot serve,
as it did for Lincoln, as the motivating analogy to political obligation
103. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403 (1857).
104. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, First Inaugural Address: Final Text, in 7 WORKS OF LINCOLN,
supra note 6, at 265. Lincoln borrows the idea of the exchange of sacred vows from the closing
lines of the Declaration of Independence. See Ronald R. Garet, Creation and Commitment:
Lincoln, Thomas, and the Declaration of Independence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1477 (1992).
105. Griswold. 381 U.S. at 486.
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and commitment. No longer symbolizing the absoluteness of fidelity,
marriage is at best "hopefully enduring."
Lincoln's hierogamy, in which the fathers sire the nation upon the
continent, rhetorically occupies a more fecund space than "the sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms," the territory to which Douglas
appeals immediately before his just-quoted conclusion. For in these
sacred precincts, married couples use devices, not only to avert
disease, but to prevent conception and childbirth. But the appearance
of relative fecundity in Lincoln's view of marriage is deceiving. For
Lincoln, as for Justice Douglas, the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms belong to a priestly religion which draws, as Blake said, "a
little curtain of flesh on the bed of our desire."1"
In his speech at Springfield in the campaign against Stephen
Douglas, Lincoln declared:
Now I protest against that counterfeit logic which concludes that
because I do not want a black woman for a slave I must neces-
sarily want her for a wife. I need not have her for either, I can
just leave her alone. In some respects she certainly is not my
equal; but in her natural right to eat the bread she earns with her
own hands without asking leave of any one else, she is my equal,
and the equal of all others. °7
Speaking in Chicago, a year later, Lincoln made a similar yet more
chilling appeal, which throws a long shadow over the first sentence of
the Gettysburg Address.
I protest, now and forever, against that counterfeit logic which
presumes that because I do not want a negro woman for a slave,
I do necessarily want her for a wife. [Laughter and cheers.] My
understanding is that I need not have her for either, but as God
made us separate, we can leave one another alone and do one
another much good thereby. There are white men enough to
marry all the white women, and enough black men to marry all
the black women, and in God's name let them so be married. 8
The proposition that all men are created equal, birthright of the
nation "conceived in liberty" through the marital act of the Founding,
means that "we can leave one another alone and do one another
much good thereby." Lincoln's phrase supplies the ironic precursor to
Brandeis and, ultimately, to Douglas; "we can leave one another
106. The Book of Thel, plate 6, line 20, in BLAKE, supra note 80, at 130.
107. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 26, 1857), in 2 WORKS OF
LINCOLN, supra note 6, at 405.
108. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Speech at Chicago (July 10, 1858), in id. at 498.
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alone" becomes "the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."'"
Lincoln agrees with Jefferson that we are created equal but Lincoln
adds that "God made us separate." Separate but equal, we will not
marry one another, we will not bring forth fruit from one another in
sacred imitation of the hierogamy that took place in illo tempore.
"The doors of marriage are open," as Blake said in his visionary
interpretation of the American revolution, "and the Priests in rustling
scales / Rush into reptile coverts, hiding from the fires of Orc."'. °
In Blake's critique of heaven and earth, "the sacred precincts of
marital bedrooms" are revealed as regions of the Shadow or Spectre,
frustrating rather than encouraging creative accomplishment.
The ironic connection between the shadow of privacy, the right to
be let alone, the regime of separate but equal, and a constitutional
order whose birthright is the equal liberty of those who are created
in the image and likeness of God, is brought out by reading Griswold
and "Gettysburg" together, and reading them gnostically. Yet irony
is not a relation either of logical entailment or of contradiction. There
is no reason why a constitutional right of marital privacy must insulate
people from one another and from responding progressively to the
challenges of sexual energy ("the fires of Orc"), cultural diversity, and
social inequality. Carefully adapted, such a right may help us instead
to grow in body and spirit through marriage. If the enrichment of our
material and spiritual nature is indeed a defining commitment of a
regime of constitutional liberty,' then one might be justified in
concluding that marriage is, or ought to be, not only a religious but
also a constitutional sacrament. Marriage is a religious sacrament
when it symbolizes and furthers the spiritual relation between God
and humankind; it is a constitutional sacrament when it symbolizes
and furthers fidelity, mutuality, communion, or any other human good
for which the exercise of liberty might be valuable.
Gnosticism offers its own special way of conceiving marriage as
sacrament. We turn to this special conception in an effort to recon-
ceive the penumbra of privacy so that marriage does not imprison us
in the ironies of "all men are created equal," but frees us instead for
redemption. Needless to say, there is room to reject this special
conception, in favor of some more traditional way of understanding
the sacred significance of marriage. But some such understanding is
needed if we are to honor, not merely avert the eyes from, the sacred
109. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See supra
note 23.
110. America: A Prophecy, plate 15. lines 19-20, in BLAKE, supra note 80, at 202.
111. See supra note 23.
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precincts of marital bedrooms. Once again, Griswold's silences are
pregnant. The opinion tells us that marriage is "an association for as
noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions"'' 2 but does
not tell us what that purpose is.
3. The Bridal Chamber
The Gospel According to Philip, an anthology of Valentinian
Gnostic sayings, makes reference to a sacrament about which little is
known: the sacrament of the bridal chamber."' For the Valen-
tinians, this sacrament may have directed a shared Christian concept,
that Christ is the groom and the church his bride, toward a peculiarly
Gnostic conception of Christ's redemptive descent. In this concept the
savior lifts the veil of creation so that we are returned to that which
precedes and exceeds it, the radiance of the fullness. For us, the
Valentinian celebration of the bridal chamber offers a way not only
to understand the hiddenness of the marital space, interpreted
constitutionally as a right of privacy in the marital bedroom, but also
to redeem Griswold's emanation from the penumbra that guards and
restrains it.
The exchange of wedding vows became a constitutional as well as
a religious sacrament when Lincoln called on the plighting of faith as
an effective symbol of fidelity in the union. The sacrament of the
bridal chamber becomes a constitutional sacrament when it symbolizes
and motivates the defining principle of gnostic constitutionalism: that
the redemption of the Constitution rests not, as with Lincoln, in a
realization of the created endowment of natural rights, but instead in
a repudiation of creation itself."4
Philip defines the mission of Jesus, his incarnation and virgin birth,
in these terms:
How fitting it is to speak of a mystery! The parent of the entirety
joined with the virgin who came down, and fire illuminated him.
On that day he revealed the great bridal bedroom; it was for this
purpose that his body came into being. On that day he came
forth from the bridal bedroom as from what comes to pass
between a bridegroom and a bride."5
112. 381 U.S. at 486.
113. See LAYTON, supra note 4, at 326.
114. Philip actually links the aspect of marriage that Lincoln valued, its claim to fidelity and
its status as an enduring union, to the meaning of marriage that more specifically commended
it to Gnosticism as a metaphor for the improvement upon creation. "Now, a woman joins with
her husband in the bridal bedroom, and those who have joined in the bridal bedroom will not
reseparate. Thus Eve became separate from Adam because it was not in the bridal bedroom that
she joined with him." Philip 70:17-21, in LAYTON, supra note 4. at 343.
115. Id. at 344 (71:3-10).
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The birth of Jesus corrects for the sin of Sophia, for he comes forth
from a complete union in the sacred space, while she attempted to
generate without complete union, and in so doing violated holy
boundaries. The bodies that descend from Sophia's abortion are
enveloped in shadow, while the body of Christ glows in fiery
illumination.
The incarnation thus supplies an allegory of perfected em-
bodiment 1 6 through a new and superior creation, both like and
unlike procreation. "The child of the human being received from god
so that he might create.... A creator works [openly], and is visible
as well. A begetter begets [secretly] and is hidden. . . . A creator then
[creates] visibly, while one who begets [begets] offspring secretly.""' 7
Yet secrecy in the marital bedroom is not just a veil politely con-
cealing sinful indulgence or the fateful harboring of the spirit in the
naturally generative body. "No [one can] know when [a male] and a
female have intercourse with one another but they alone. For the
marriage of this world is a mystery for those who have married. If the
marriage of pollution is hidden, how much more is unpolluted
marriage a genuine mystery!"' 18 Thus, while conventional marital
intercourse is hidden in the sense of being secret, the sacrament of the
bridal chamber involves a form of open creativity, since it touches on
a genuine mystery. "Bridegrooms and brides belong to the bridal
chamber. No one can see a bridegroom or a bride except by becoming
such."" 9 Privacy in the marital space ceases to occupy the shadows
and begins to symbolize initiation into the light of truth.
Philip offers an interpretation of "the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms" that makes respect for those holy places a symbol of "the
mysteries of truth," and entry into them an allegory of rising from the
created order to a higher spirituality.2 '
116. Philip presents the bridal chamber as protecting the initiate from male and female
"unclean spirits": "when they see a man and his wife sitting together, the female ones cannot
make advances to the male, nor can the male ones make advances to the female." Philip in
LAYTON, supra note 4, at 340 (65:1, 19-22). While Philip affirms a kind of protective spiritual
androgyny, whose sacrament is marital, Blake inverts these values; androgyny or hermaphroditic
form is associated with the guardian Spectre, who thwarts the full expression and incorporation
of creative vision. Hence the decline of sexual contrariety into "a mournful form double,
hermaphroditic, male & female" expresses one of the risks of Beulah. Milton, bk. 1, plate 14,
line 37, supra note 69, at 496.
117. Philip in LAYTON, supra note 4, at 350-51 (81:19, 28-32). I take this to be a comparison
between the higher creativity that is available to the human being who has "received from god"
and the lower creativity of those who are capable only of physical procreation, because their
marital intimacy takes place outside of the bridal chamber, the sacrament of redemptive
knowledge.
118. Id. at 351 (81:34-82:6).
119. Id. (82:23-24).
120. Id. at 352 (84:20).
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At present we have access to the visible aspects of creation. We
say that they are what is mighty and glorious, while hidden things
are powerless and contemptible. Are the hidden aspects of truth
like this? Are they powerless? And are they contemptible? No,
rather these hidden aspects are mighty, glorious. 2'
The sacredness of the bedroom communicates the power of the truth
that lies behind creation: "Now, the mysteries of truth are manifestly
representations and images. Thus the bedroom is hidden away: this
stands for the holy within the holy." 2 2 But redemption tears the veil
that hides the sacred space; the penumbra is dispelled, all things are
seen in pure light of the fullness, and we sacramentally enter the
sacred precincts. "Thus perfect things were opened to us, along with
the hidden aspects of truth. And the holy of holies was uncovered.
And the bedroom invites us in.""
V. CONCLUSION
A. A Hidden Redemption
In the decades that have followed Griswold, the Supreme Court has
looked to the due process clause to decide whether the right of
privacy is violated by state laws regulating abortion,2 ' or disap-
proving of certain forms of sexual intercourse, 2-5 or requiring clear
and convincing evidence of a patient's competent wishes before
lifesaving care may be withdrawn from an individual who is irrevers-
ibly comatose. 26 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Court has not adopted
in these cases, at least overtly, any view of how the right of privacy
advances our "spiritual nature. 1 27 Indeed, the Court has been
reluctant to base decisions on premises about what is humanly good
or worthwhile, whether spiritually or otherwise. As John Finnis
observes, this judicial abstention from thought about what is or is not
a human good has eased the way to conclusions such as "(i) what is
true of sexual relations that express and support a mutual commit-
ment which makes possible a good environment for the emergence
and development of children must equally, and obviously, be true of
even the most casual one-night stand; and (ii) what is true of the




124. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
125. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
126. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
127. See supra text accompanying note 23.
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have a child."' 2  These conclusions reflect Griswold's double move:
affirmation that marriage deserves special protection due to its noble
purpose, coupled with silence regarding the nature of that purpose.
When individual judges have been willing to take stands about what
is good in life, or what makes life worth living, their positions have
come under attack as undeveloped or poorly reasoned. Finnis
criticizes Justices Stevens and Brennan for concluding hastily that life
in a persistent vegetative state is of no value.'29 Their implicitly
dualistic position, Finnis concludes, is false to the "complex unity" of
personal identity, and inconsistent with the fact that "one's living
body is one's person. '""' Some might say that it is precisely the
vulnerability of propositions about what is humanly good or
worthwhile to criticism, especially under the social conditions
characteristic of modern democratic political life, that disqualifies
them from serving as premises in arguments resolving constitutional
claims. In some cases, however, justifications of constitutional
decisions may well be rendered weaker, not stronger, through judges'
unwillingness to blend premises about the good into the argumen-
tative mix.
The question of the place of ideas about human nature and human
flourishing in the public justification of constitutional choices in a
constitutional democracy is deep and complex. 3' Under the con-
ditions of cultural diversity and enduring disagreement that charac-
terize modernity, the ideal of equal citizenship may require those who
offer public justification for public choices, perhaps especially judges
who state reasons for their holdings in constitutional cases, to work
with reasons whose force does not depend on metaphysical or
spiritual premises.'32 Appeal to the ethic of creation may violate this
stricture. Claims about God's creation are assertions, necessarily
controversial, about the ground of being. Yet constitutional arguments
framed in terms of the ethic of creation may not always violate the
boundaries of democratic consensus. The language of the Declaration
128. John Finnis, The "Value of Human Life" and "The Right to Death": Some Reflections
on Cruzan and Ronald Dworkin, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 559, 561 (1993) (referring to Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that equal protection clause bars government from
restricting contraceptive use to married persons)).
129. 497 U.S. 261,345 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Id. at 309-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130. Finnis, supra note 128, at 568. Finnis's justification of legal regulation of sexual conduct
or orientation in order to avert personal disintegration provides the definitive contemporary
elaboration of natural law within the limits of the ethic of creation: the ethic that gnosticism
challenges. See Ronald R. Garet, Deposing Finnis, S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. (forthcoming 1995).
131. See John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason: Further Considerations, Lecture (Nov. 2,
1993) (text on file with author).
132. Id. at 15 ("[Ildeally, on fundamental political matters, democratic citizens should be
prepared to argue their case in the public forum, not directly from their comprehensive
doctrines, religious or otherwise, but from their shared political conception of justice.").
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of Independence, for better and for worse, has domesticated the ethic
of creation, and tamed metaphysical claims about human nature into
a shared political principle of equal rights.
Constitutional arguments that take their cue from our status as
redeemed or redeemable (in whatever sense), rather than from our
status as created, are not so readily absorbed within the complex
patterns of political consensus within our democratic culture.
Moreover, arguments that rest on the conviction that the offer of
redemption provides our most reliable reality act as reagents within
the culture, bringing the creationist appeals out of solution, revealing
them in their discrete metaphysical particularity. Whether Messianic,
or generically Christian, or specifically gnostic, these arguments,
springing from the apprehension of a regime of grace that is epis-
temically and ontologically prior to the laws of nature, provoke the
ethic of creation to reveal itself for what it is: a contested metaphysics.
The natural law tradition has assumed that reason is the human
faculty that preserves the imago dei,'33 and that reason is at home
in the natural order, capable of discerning intelligible goods and strict
negative precepts. '34 This tradition, as articulated by Finnis and
others, has claimed the warrant of reason for the two proposals
mentioned above: that the person is the living body (persons do not
have bodies), and that marriage is a special relationship oriented to
significant human goods. Within the tradition, proposals such as these
issue in a denunciation of contraceptive practices as unreasonable and
unworthy.1
35
Griswold, on the interpretation of it that I have offered here,
confronts these natural law claims at every turn. Constitutional
freedoms, the opinion intimates, should be understood not as natural
rights but as Christian liberties. Reason is fitted to the created order,
but the eye of imagination looks beyond that order. The body is not
only part of creation, blessed with an endowment and subject to
natural laws, but is also and more importantly dignified by the
redemptive incarnation of the Word. The sacredness of marriage is a
function not only of its representation of the founding, or of the
created order, or of the original paradise, but also and more impor-
tantly of its sacramental status, involving us in the reception of and
response to the Word. Claims such as these are made in Blake's
133. See generally Edmund N. Santurri, Who Is My Neighbor? Love, Equality, and
Profoundly Retarded Humans, in THE LOVE COMMANDMENTS: ESSAYS IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS
AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 104-37 (Edmund Santurri & William Werpehowski eds., 1992).
134. See JOHN FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES: TRADITION, REVISION, AND TRUTH 73-74, 99
(1991).
135. Germain Grisez et al., "Every Marital Act Ought To Be Open To New Life": Toward
a Clearer Understanding, 52 THE THOMIST 365-426 (1988).
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confession of his Christian faith: "I know of no other Christianity and
of no other Gospel than the liberty both of body & mind to exercise
the Divine Arts of Imagination, Imagination, the real & eternal World
of which this Vegetable Universe is but a faint shadow, & in which we
shall live in our Eternal or Imaginative Bodies when these Vegetable
Mortal Bodies are no more.,
13 6
Yet Justice Douglas does not say this "openly & publicly" as Blake
would have him do.137 And there is room to doubt whether he
would have wanted to say it even privately. For the Douglas who
wrote Griswold was also the champion of environmentalism,'38 the
protector of wilderness, the man whose lifelong recreation was
pursued in long walks among the mountains. Therefore, we must not
be surprised when Douglas closes ranks with "the laws of nature and
of nature's God" and embraces (however clumsily) a naturalistic
interpretation of "all men are created equal" and of the texts of
liberty.'39 Douglas's naturalistic intuitions and commitments ill-
suited him to play the part of the gnostic visionary. At home in the
ethic of creation, he could never entertain an emancipatory vision that
unequivocally required the subordination of creation to redemption
in the name of spiritual freedom. 4 °
136. Jerusalem, plate 77, in BLAKE, supra note 80, at 716-17.
137. Id. at 717.
138. See Christopher Stone, Commentary: William 0. Douglas and the Environment, in
LEGACY, supra note 20, at 229-31; Charles Wilkinson, Justice Douglas and the Public Lands, in
LEGACY, supra note 20, at 233-37.
139. Douglas cited the creationist passages of the Declaration of Independence approvingly
in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 562-63 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 89 (1958) ("The penumbra of the Bill of
Rights reflects human rights which, though not explicit, are implied by the very nature of man
as a child of God."). While Douglas may have meant in this passage only to affirm the ethic of
creation, the statement is ironic when taken gnostically. The gnostic meaning is that human
nature as created can only imply rights dubiously, that is, in partial shadow.
140. Douglas's soulmate among the Romantics would have been Wordsworth. not Blake.
Douglas could have joined the "high argument" of his fellow follower of nature:
How exquisitely the individual Mind
(And the progressive powers perhaps no less
Of the whole species) to the external World
Is fitted:-and how exquisitely too-
Theme this but little heard of among men-
The external World is fitted to the Mind.
Prospectus to The Recluse, lines 63-68, in THE POETICAL WORKS OF WORDSWORTH 755
(Thomas Hutchinson ed., 1939). Blake's caustic annotation to these lines was: "You shall not
bring me down to believe such fitting & fitted. I know better & please your Lordship."
Annotations to The Excursion, in BLAKE, supra note 80, at 784. "I see in Wordsworth the
Natural Man rising up against the Spiritual Man Continually, & then he is No Poet but a
Heathen Philosopher at Enmity against all true Poetry or Inspiration." Annotations to Poems
by William Wordsworth, in Complete Writings 481 (Geoffrey Keynes ed., 1972).
The great issue surrounding Lincoln's invitation to read the Constitution in the light of "all
men are created equal" is whether we shall approach Jefferson through the medium of
Wordsworth or Blake. For an exercise in the Wordsworthian interpretation of the Declaration
of Independence, see Ronald R. Garet, The Resolution of Independence. 29 HOUSTON L. REV.
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B. Reading by Dim Light
Whether naturalist or gnostic, however, a Christian must share the
faith that "the Word became flesh and dwelt among us,'' 4 and must
make sense of that faith in the practice of life and law. In making
John's affirmation one's own, a Christian confesses that God is
encountered in the flesh and in the body (however that is to be
understood). How far could Douglas as a Christian judge, engaged in
the work of interpreting and applying the Constitution in the course
of judicial review, give effect to that fundamental affirmation? Apart
from any limits set by the nature and justification of the institution of
judicial review in a constitutional democracy, what limits are set by
Christian principles?
The decisive Christian limit is set by the distinction between the
logos, the Word of God, and the Constitution, the word of (a portion
of) humankind. From a Christian point of view it is the former, and
not the latter, however ideally written and read, that redeems. The
word-of-God-become-flesh is the divine body of Jesus, while the
word-of-humankind-become-flesh is a monster or an idol. For the
logos is the Torah, which is God's self-revelation. It is both the
command of God and the meaningful order inherent in and operating
within the created world. It is the divine performative that makes us
God's children.
42
In becoming flesh, the logos is hypostatized not merely in the
general sense of pervading the cosmos as its animating meaning, the
rational order that directs it, but also in the narrower and more
difficult sense of becoming a person, empowered to engender our
personhood as God's children. "Thus the Logos, or Wisdom, which
was the original principle of creation, acts creatively once again in
giving men a new birth as sons of God. '1 43 The word-become-flesh
concentrates God's creative thought "in an individual who is what
humanity was designed to be in the divine purpose, and therefore is
rightly called the 'Son of Man,"'144 or "the divine, essential
867 (1992). For an absorbing study of the gnostic themes in Romanticism, see PAUL CANTOR,
ROMANTIC MAN: CREATURE AND CREATOR (1984).
141. John 1:14. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
142. C. H. DODD, THE INTERPRETATION OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL 270-85 (1968). Dodd says
that the logos enjoys the performative power of a judicial declaration of rights. "Those who
received the word, to them it gave the right to become children of God." Id. at 270 (citing John
1:12). Dodd translates exousia as "right" rather than "power." "What God 'calls' men, that in
fact they are, for His word possesses and confers exousia." Id. at 271 n.1. The word is
declaratory of new jural relations: more specifically, of a new birth; for the "children of God"
are those "who were born, not of blood or of the will of the flesh or of the will of man, but of
God." John 1:13.
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humanity." '145 "He is the reflection of God's glory and the exact
imprint of God's very being, and he sustains (bears along) all things
by his powerful word."'"
The Prologue to the Gospel of John readies the reader to be reborn
by the word that brings humanity into being. It is appropriate, then,
that it introduces the mission of John the Baptist, who prepared the
way for Jesus, and testified to his identity. The first words of this
introduction are Egeneto anthropos: "there became, there came into
existence, a man."'47 The coming-into-being of the human is induced
by that which is eternal, permanent being, entering into the realm of
becoming (flesh). The individuality of the Baptist reminds us to
particularize this replenishing of human being from God's fullness;
14 8
a particular human person, John, came to testify, and likewise the
object of his testimony was a particular person, not a type of
humankind, nor a reed through which the spirit blows. "Flesh"
suggests not only the "becoming" of the human existent (born into
life, subject to death) but its instantiation in particular human
persons.4 9
Whatever else it may be, the Constitution is not a person, hence it
cannot bring out the personhood in us in the way that only relations
among persons can. For this reason it cannot bring out in us the
embodiment that is fundamental to our personhood, the embodiment
that is to be raised up.5 ° Yet the Christian judge working with the
constitutional text is not in this respect much worse off than the
Christian poet working with the texts of other Christian poets. While
we do not know what texts, canonical or otherwise, were known to
145. Id. at 281.
146. Hebrews 1:3.
147. Frank Kermode, John, in THE LITERARY GUIDE TO THE BIBLE 446 (Robert Alter &
Frank Kermode eds., 1987).
148. John 1:16.
149. The New Testament image of the church as the body of Christ is not inconsistent with
this central account of redemption or rebirth as a possibility addressed to individual human
persons. The church as "his body, the fullness of him who fills all in all," Ephesians 1:23, is one
dimension of the grace to which John refers in the Prologue: "From his fullness we have all
received grace upon grace," John 1:16. Thus, we share in the pleroma in all structures of our
existence, personal and communitarian. In all such structures we are embodied; our "person"
is one such body, the church is another. (This insight is weakly reflected in ordinary English
usage, which describes organizations like churches as "corporate" entities: entities which are
bodily, somatic, or (via the Latin) corporate.)
Sexual union also creates a body: "Do you not know that whoever is united to a prostitute
becomes one body with her? For it is said, 'The two shall become one flesh."' 1 Corinthians 6:16.
Thus, if the primary referent of the word-become-flesh is the embodied person, the secondary
referent is the embodied community.
150. John makes the resurrection of the body a sign confirming Jesus's teaching; not only
does the word become flesh, but the resurrection of the body confirms the word. Jesus says of
"the temple of his body": "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up;" "After he
was raised from the dead, his disciples remembered that he had said this; and they believed the
scripture and the word that Jesus had spoken." John 2:21, 2:19, 2:22.
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Valentinus, we can say with confidence that Blake had before him the
text of Paradise Lost, and (through Milton and many another
medium) the Bible and the canon of the classics. Blake knew the
Bible as few today know the Constitution, but he also knew Milton
(and Michelangelo) and was able to conceive his idea of anthropos,
"The Eternal Great Humanity Divine,"151 only because he invoked
the genius of the poet and the artist. He offered to redeem their
vision, and in return they fashioned for him the "bright sandal" with
which "to walk forward thro' Eternity.',
5 2
The promise of gnostic due process was, necessarily, unfulfilled. The
text of liberty did not emanate in radiance, but relapsed into partial
shadows of concealment. Even now, however, the genius of the
constitutionalist supplies a fitful light by which to read the traces of
redemption. Therefore I say of the Constitution what the hymnist said
of Scripture: that though its full meaning is withheld from me, "I can
read His righteous sentence by the dim and flaring lamps.""' 3 No
other reading is possible until the beams of love dispel the penumbra
of privacy. Douglas, you are no Milton, and heaven knows I am no
Blake; but, having no other light to read by, I hold my text closer to
your dim and flaring lamp.
151. Milton, bk. 1, plate 2, line 8, supra note 69, at 481.
152. Id., bk. 1, plate 21, lines 8, at 503.
153. Julia Ward Howe, "The Battle Hymn of the Republic," stanza 2, in AMERICAN HYMNS
OLD AND NEW 286 (Albert Christ Janer et al. eds., 1980)
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